By Akua Barden
The attack in northern Burkina Faso has once again forced West Africa to confront an uncomfortable truth: military force alone will not defeat violent extremism in the Sahel.
For years, governments have leaned heavily on what security experts call the “kinetic” approach — boots on the ground, firepower, and troop deployments. Yet history has shown its limits. From foreign interventions in the Middle East to prolonged insurgencies closer to home, superior firepower has not always translated into lasting peace. In many cases, it has left deeper instability behind.
If anything, the lesson is clear: extremism is not only a military problem. It is a governance problem. It is an economic problem. It is a community problem. Unless it is treated as such, it will keep resurfacing.
The case for a human security approach
The smarter path forward is non-kinetic. That means focusing on human security: protecting livelihoods, strengthening institutions, improving governance, and addressing the grievances that extremist groups exploit.
Across the Sahel, large ungoverned spaces, weak state presence, unemployment, and uneven resource distribution create fertile ground for radical ideologies. These groups often cloak themselves in religious language, but beneath that rhetoric are political frustrations and economic despair.
Where communities feel neglected, marginalised, or locked out of opportunity, extremist recruiters find their opening.
The solution cannot simply be more soldiers. It must include better governance, fairer resource allocation, stronger local economies, and meaningful inclusion.
Ghana’s preventive model
To its credit, Ghana has invested significantly in prevention. Through its national framework for preventing violent extremism and conflict, the country has adopted what security analysts describe as a layered approach.
Prevention comes first. Intelligence coordination, community engagement, border surveillance, and public awareness initiatives like “See Something, Say Something” are part of that strategy. Institutions such as the West Africa Center for Counter-Extremism have also focused on training security personnel in border management and conflict-sensitive operations.
This preventive posture has helped Ghana remain relatively stable while instability spreads across parts of the Sahel. It has also strengthened intelligence-sharing and collaboration with neighbouring states, sometimes leading to cross-border cooperation in handling suspects linked to extremist networks.
But prevention cannot become complacency. Border communities remain vulnerable. Areas like Lawra, where cross-border movement is fluid and logistical resources are thin, expose structural weaknesses. Understaffed immigration posts and limited surveillance capacity create risks that cannot be ignored.
If security is a priority, border resourcing must reflect it.
The regional dimension
No country in West Africa can insulate itself completely. Traders move daily between Ghana, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and beyond. Informal crossings, river routes, and shared ethnic ties blur national boundaries.
This reality demands strong regional cooperation.
ECOWAS was designed to foster exactly that. Yet critics increasingly describe it as slow or under-resourced in responding to today’s security challenges. Whether fair or not, the perception matters.
Still, blaming the regional body alone misses the point. Regional security is only as strong as the national systems that underpin it. Each member state must treat security architecture as a core responsibility: properly funding security services, improving governance, reducing unemployment, and addressing internal conflicts before they metastasise.
Initiatives like the Accra Initiative were meant to deepen intelligence collaboration and joint responses. Revitalising such frameworks is urgent.
Diplomacy also has a role. Ghana’s efforts to maintain dialogue with Sahelian governments, including engagement with the Alliance of Sahel States, reflect a recognition that isolation rarely enhances security. Strategic relationships, even with difficult partners, can create channels for coordination and crisis management.
Governance is security
Ultimately, the most powerful defence against extremism is good governance.
Protracted chieftaincy disputes, land conflicts, youth unemployment, food insecurity, and perceptions of injustice all weaken national cohesion. These are not abstract policy issues — they are security risks.
When communities trust their institutions, feel economically included, and see fair dispute resolution mechanisms at work, extremist narratives struggle to gain traction. When governance deficits persist, extremist groups attempt to position themselves as alternative authorities, often with devastating consequences.
Security, then, is not just about weapons. It is about legitimacy.
A personal and national responsibility
There is another important dimension often overlooked: security begins at home. Citizens, communities, and institutions all share responsibility. Awareness, vigilance, and cooperation with law enforcement strengthen national resilience.
At the same time, governments must match rhetoric with resources. Recruitment without deployment to vulnerable areas solves little. Border officers without equipment cannot secure porous crossings. Intelligence without coordination leads nowhere.
West Africa stands at a crossroads. The violence in the Sahel is a warning, not a distant headline. Ghana’s relative stability is an achievement, but it is not a guarantee.
If the region continues to treat extremism as merely a military problem, it will remain trapped in a cycle of reaction. If it embraces governance reform, economic inclusion, regional cooperation, and sustained prevention, it has a real chance to bend the curve.
The conversation must move beyond condolences and troop numbers. It must confront the deeper structural weaknesses that extremists exploit.
Because in the end, bullets can suppress a threat. Only justice, opportunity, and credible governance can remove it.
