By Magdalene Andoh
Economists are urging policymakers to stop judging the Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod) as a profit-seeking trading entity and instead recognise it as a strategic macroeconomic stabilisation tool that has delivered outsized benefits to Ghana’s economy.
This position is outlined in a technical report titled “Evaluating the Macroeconomic Effects of the Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod)”, presented to GoldBod by researchers from the University of Ghana and the University of Ghana Business School. The report was authored by Prof. Festus Ebo Turkson, Peter Junior Dotse, and Prof. Agyapomaa Gyeke-Dako, and dated January 4, 2026.
According to the economists, much of the public debate around GoldBod has been distorted by a narrow focus on reported trading losses at the Bank of Ghana, rather than on the programme’s broader stabilisation role and long-term economic returns.
A Policy Instrument, Not a Profit Centre
The report argues that GoldBod was designed to formalise gold exports, stabilise the foreign exchange market, and strengthen reserves, not to maximise short-term profits. Using conservative assumptions, the authors estimate that GoldBod helped formalise 39.4 tonnes of gold in 2025 alone, generating approximately US$3.8 billion in additional foreign exchange that would otherwise have been lost to smuggling.
These gains, the report notes, far exceed the US$214 million trading loss reported by the Bank of Ghana, yielding a benefit–cost ratio of about 18 to 1.
“The appropriate benchmark is not whether GoldBod makes accounting profits, but whether it delivers macroeconomic stability at a lower cost than available alternatives,” the economists argue.
Stabilising the Economy
GoldBod-supported inflows contributed to higher international reserves estimated at US$11–12 billion, improved exchange-rate stability, lower domestic costs of external debt servicing, and easing inflationary pressures.
The report also highlights GoldBod’s role in providing non-debt foreign exchange, reducing Ghana’s reliance on costly external borrowing. GoldBod-enabled ASM exports reached US$10.8 billion in 2025, avoiding annual interest costs that could have exceeded US$1 billion if equivalent funds had been borrowed externally.
Rethinking the “Loss” Narrative
The economists explain that most of the reported Bank of Ghana loss reflects accounting translation effects, arising from differences between retail and interbank exchange rates, rather than real cash losses. They estimate the true economic cost of the programme at around 2.5 per cent of gold value, well below the macroeconomic benefits delivered.
Policy Directions Going Forward
Looking ahead, the report calls for a shift in how GoldBod is governed and financed. Key recommendations include:
- Sustaining price competitiveness to prevent a return of gold smuggling
- Improving transparency by clearly separating accounting effects from economic costs in official reporting
- Gradually reducing policy costs as foreign exchange market conditions normalise
- Strengthening governance and oversight to safeguard credibility
- Treating GoldBod’s operational costs as a quasi-fiscal expense, explicitly funded through the national budget
The authors stress that failure to adopt this framework risks undermining a policy tool that has already delivered substantial economic returns.
A Long-Term Strategic Asset
The report concludes that GoldBod should be institutionalised as a long-term stabilisation mechanism, rather than evaluated through the lens of short-term profit and loss.
Based on the available evidence, the economists argue that GoldBod represents a high-return policy intervention—one that converts illicit gold flows into formal foreign exchange, strengthens Ghana’s external position, and supports sustained macroeconomic stability.
